In this paper we measure branching costs and competitiveness of European banks by fitting a monopolistic competition model to a representative sample drawn from nine EEC banking industries in the period from 1990 to 1996. In the theoretical model, banks decide strategically the size of their branching network anticipating the degree of competition faced on interest rates. From the structural equations of the model we derive an econometric test in order to measure branching costs and degree of competition in banking services. The empirical analysis captures their changing over time together with the impact of various European directives aiming at deregulating the banking industry. Furthermore the paper shows persistence of segmentation across EEC banking industries.
Introduction
Since the eighties, the European banking industries, before heavily regulated, have experienced a phase of deregulation. At country level, regulators have left more and more market forces to determine the structure of the market. Today, in almost all EEC countries, banks are free to compete for their clients. At the EEC level, each country has committed to remove barriers across financial markets, in order to move towards a complete integration of markets, both on the demand and the supply side. These two aspects have important implications for competition in the banking industry, as they imply that, since the process of deregulation has started, the structure of the banking industry can be better explained by the outcome of strategic interaction of banks rather than by the regulatory framework.
The European banking industry provides an interesting challenge for a test of a model of monopolistic banking competition. First, the set of regulations alone does not fully explain the evolution of the industry structure; second, the changes in the institutional setting allow us to test the impact of regulation on the conduct of banks and on the structure of the banking industry.
The process of deregulation has strong implications on competition among banks and on banks decisions to enter or exit markets. By deregulation we mean the changes in rules, implemented at the national level mainly in response to EEC directives, which influence either the conduct or the structure of banking markets. In these years almost all EEC members have implemented policies that, by lifting controls on interest rates or fighting cartels among the largest banks more fiercely, have increased the ability to compete on interest rates by the overall banking system. On the demand side, policies towards larger integration of financial markets have been pursued by lifting capital controls at the country level, and on the supply side, by reducing the cost of entry into new banking markets. These policies may have affected the decision of entering and opening of new branches across countries and indirectly the amount of competition that banks envisage to face in the future.
An important objective of deregulation is to increase the degree of competitiveness in the banking industry in order to reduce the price of financial services for customers in this industry. However, as already pointed out by some papers, deregulation has increased the degree of concentration in the European banking industries, 1 as a result of a consolidation process, mainly inside borders, that has occurred in the past years. This may limit the expected benefits of deregulation on allocative efficiency, if the monopoly power of each bank has not decreased.
Furthermore, deregulation, by increasing the toughness of price competition may have reduced the incentives to set larger branching network. This may have occurred for two reasons. First, as profits shrink as a result of tougher interest rate competition, banks may find less profitable to maintain larger branching networks. Second, because interest rate competition has for a long time been impeded in some countries, branching networks have been the only way to gain new clients, giving rise to overinvestment in branches.
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The aim of this paper is to analyse and measure these potential effects of deregulation, namely the degree of competitiveness acquired by the banking industry and the changes in branching strategies within each banking system. To sum up, we estimate branching costs and the degree of competition by market, building our econometric analysis on a model of monopolistic competition, where banks compete for deposits both in interest rates and branching networks.
The main result of this paper is that, after deregulation, the degree of competition in interest rates in the EEC banking industries has risen. Our econometric analysis helps also in understanding the impact of deregulation on the average branching size of banks. While, from a glance at the data, the average branching size for all countries of our sample seems increasing over time (see Table 1 below), we show that indeed the likelihood of opening new branches is smaller.
Furthermore we find that, when evaluating the impact of deregulation on competitiveness and branching costs, only capital flow liberalization had a significant impact, while other directives had less of an impact. More particularly, our findings show that capital flow liberalization has increased competitiveness, while the Second European Directive had a minor impact on branching costs.
1 See Gual and Neven (1992) , Economic Research Europe (ERE) Summary Report (1996), Cerasi (1996) , European Central Bank (ECB) (1999) and Gual (1999) for evidence on the impact of deregulation on the degree of concentration in the European banking industry. 2 See for example Neven (1989) and Cerasi (1996) for implications of deregulation on the size of branching networks.
In addition, even though, in all European banking industries, there is a trend towards tougher price competition and shrinking branching networks, this cannot be attributed directly to the actual implementation of a specific EEC directive. We take this as a non surprising evidence that regulation at country level is more effective in shaping the structure of the industry than that at the European Community.
Another objective of our analysis is to measure the degree of integration across EEC banking industries. We present evidence of persistence of segmentation across banking industries, given by the fact that both competitiveness and branching costs are very sensitive to country specific factors.
One appealing feature in the paper is that the empirical analysis does not rely on accounting data, thus avoiding the problem of comparing accounting data taken from different banking systems. The reason is that, by using a two-stage game to describe banking competition, we are able to build our estimation on a reduced form for bank profits, which is based on measures of the market size and on the number of branches for each single bank, but without reference to activity volumes and interest rates.
Moreover, our econometric test is derived from a theoretical model. This allows us, first of all, to interpret our results on a stronger ground than other empirical analysis, and secondly, to derive some restrictions on the type of economic models that better describes bank competitive behavior in the retail segment.
Our paper fits into the empirical literature on the European banking industry. There is a growing empirical literature on several aspects of the structure of this industry, connected to the changes in regulation at the EEC level. Chiappori, Perez-Castrillo and Verdier (1995) provide empirical evidence on the impact of deregulation on the banking industry. Although their empirical evidence rests on a model of spatial competition, 3 they test its implications on a reduced form, while we follow a structural approach. Molyneux, Lloyd-Williams and Thornton (1994) and Neven and Roller (1999) estimate the degree of competitiveness of the European banking industry by using aggregate data, whereas we deal with disaggregate data at the bank level. Finally, several papers study the determinants of bank branching behavior, as for example Cabral and Majure (1993) , Barros (1995) and Kim and Vale (1999) , although focusing on a specific industry, i.e. Portugal and Norway, while we are interested in finding the underlying branching behavior of banks across countries.
The theoretical model and the econometric test are presented in the next section. Section 3 describes sample data and the observable variables used in the econometric test. In section 4
the results are presented together with an evaluation of the goodness of the fit. Finally, section 5 concludes the paper.
Bank branching behavior
In the banking industry, as in many other industries, there are two relevant segments: the retail and the wholesale market. 4 In the retail segment, banks mainly collect deposits and lend funds to households and firms. Incumbent banks compete for clients either by expanding their branching networks or by setting interest rates on financial services.
In the wholesale segment, banks may in addition supply a large variety of financial services, as for example underwriting of new issues, intermediation of different financial activities, etc. In the two segments, banks might differ also with respect to their size. In particular, large banks do tend to operate in the wholesale segment, where it is unlikely to find small banks. Here we focus on the retail segment where the vast majority of banks operate, irrespective of their size, and where it is easier to model strategic interactions among banks. Notice however that this segmentation in the banking industry has been changing over time and it is not so sharp nowadays as a result of the implementation of the Second European Directive that has redefined the functions of banks.
Banks, in the retail market, compete for clients by topping their rivals interest rates and by locating their branches closer to their clients. In other words, banks can exploit the fact that their clients have preferences over locations, in order to mitigate interest rates competition and earn some market power by enlarging their branching network. These two dimensions of competition are not independent: on the one hand, the larger the number of branches in a market, the tougher the competition on interest rates will be; on the other hand, the degree of competition on interest rates affects the incentive to expand the branching network through bank profits. The relation between competition on interest rates and branching must be modeled together. The solution proposed in this paper is a static non-cooperative two-stage game where branching decisions are taken in the first stage, while interest rates are set in the second stage.
The decision to open branches depends on the effect that opening new branches has on its own clientele and on rivals' response to it. Opening new branches augments the demand for services to the bank (expansive effect), but it may also cause a relocation of clients either from branches of rivals, or from preexistent branches of the same bank (competitive effect).
The benefits of opening new branches on profits of the bank depend very much on the relative strength of the expansive and the competitive effect.
However, opening new branches, has a fixed cost, independently of the size of their operations, as for example the cost of hiring personnel, the cost of renting or buying facilities in that particular region, etc. A tougher price competition in the region reduces the expected profits of the new branch and therefore, the ability to recover the fixed costs. Then the bank will likely decide not to open new branches. In several countries, the ability to compete in interest rates has in fact been for long time impeded, in particular for small institutions, and thus the size of branching networks has become the main strategic variable for banks. It is believed that, in many countries, banks own too many branches and that tougher competition in interest rates will reduce the average size of networks.
The focus of this paper is on branching behavior of banks at the micro level, while we take the structure of the industry as exogenous, namely the number of banks that have entered the market is given. The reason, is that in the present sample there are not enough entries to be able to test directly the decision to enter.
The model
Let us analyze the two-stage game where branching decisions are taken in the first stage, and then interest rates are set in the second stage. Solving backwards, we postulate that there exists a non-cooperative symmetric solution to the second stage of the game, namely the competition in interest rates, and that in equilibrium the profits of each bank can be characterized by a reduced-form which satisfies some regularity conditions 5 .
In order to understand the shape of this reduced-form for profits, let us briefly discuss the determinants of branch supply for banks. Given the second-stage game equilibrium profits, in the first stage of the game each bank sets optimally the size of its network equating the benefit of an additional branch to the cost of opening it. The marginal benefit of opening an additional branch is the profits gain of an additional branch, while the cost of an additional branch captures the opportunity cost, that is the cost of hiring personnel, the rent of spaces for the activities of the branch and all sorts of investment opportunities which are forgone by deciding to open a new branch.
Assume that in a market of size S, there are n banks with k i branches each, where i=1,…,n.
Define the total number of branches operating in the market N. Let ε i be the cost of an additional branch which, for simplicity, we assume to be constant and independent upon the size of the network. The marginal benefit of an additional branch, MB(k i ), is obtained by taking the first order derivative of the equilibrium profits with respect to k i .
The optimal size is given by the number of branches k i *>1 such that MB(k i *) = ε i . This condition defines the optimal size for multi-branch banks. It could happen however that
In this case bank i will open only its headquarters and we define it as a unit bank.
be a special case of the reduced-form for the profits satisfying all required conditions, namely it is (i) increasing in k i , (ii) concave in k i and (iii) decreasing in N. Furthermore this function is increasing in S, that is the larger the market size the higher the profits for each bank in the market. Notice that for large N, the parameter c is approximately equal to the elasticity of profits to own branching size. This parameter c, which is a measure of the profitability of an additional branch, can be more interestingly interpreted as the inverse of the degree of toughness of interest rates competition in the market. In other words, each additional branch delivers lower profits if competition in interest rates gets tougher, thus a smaller c indicates higher degrees of competition.
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The marginal benefit of opening a new branch, given our specific reduced-form, is the derivative of the profit function in equation (1) with respect to k i :
The first order condition (FOC) for branching is given by, either
thus the optimal number of branches is greater than 1 and bank i is a multi-branch bank,
therefore bank i operates with only its headquarters and thus is a unit bank.
Notice that the theoretical model is already set in a form which can be directly verified. In other words, the structural equation of the model, given by the FOC in the first stage equilibrium of the game, is a function of observable variables alone, related to the characteristics of the markets in which banks operate. Let us now characterize the distribution of branching costs and translate this simple static model into the econometric model to be tested. 6 The parameter c may as well capture other factors affecting the elasticity of profits to branching, as for instance shifts in demand and supply of banking services. Although some of them are captured by other variables, as for instance by the market size S, our interpretation can actually be restrictive. Still, in our sample, except for technological changes, shifts in profits are mainly due to changes in the interest rates competition.
The econometric test
Assume that bank i sets its optimal branching network independently across markets and through time. Define bank i {i=1,..n} operating in market j {j=1,..J} at time t {t=1,..T} as a single observation (ijt). For all banks in the sample the branching network decision must fulfill either the FOC in equation (3a) or in (3b). Slightly modifying equation (2) and setting the appropriate subscripts, we can define a threshold:
Given the FOCs in equations (3a) and (3b), we have that, in equilibrium, either:
where ∆k ijt =k ijt -k ij,t-1 , or one of the following conditions must hold:
The above conditions can be restated as follows: for all expanding multi-branch banks the branching cost must be smaller than the threshold; for all shrinking multi-branch and unit banks the branching cost must be larger than the threshold.
Assume now that, for each period t and market j, bank i draws its branching cost from a random variable with density function f ε and cumulative function F ε . This variable is identically and independently distributed across time, markets and banks, conditionally on a vector of exogenous variables W ijt , to be defined in the next section. The set of inequalities,
given by the equilibrium conditions in (5a) and (5b), can now be cast in probabilistic terms as either:
These probabilities can be restated as follows: a change in the network size of a bank depends upon the probability that the branching cost is larger (respectively, smaller or equal) than the threshold value. Notice that the probabilities associated to shrinking multi-branch and unit banks are identical. Note further that the assumption of independence of branching costs across time, markets and banks implies, in probabilistic terms, that each observation can be treated as an independent unit.
To move to the empirical test, we partition all observations in the sample into two disjoint subsets:
and E 2t = {(ijt) such that ∆k ijt < 0 and k ijt >1, or k ijt =1}
with E 1t ∩ E 2t = ∅, E 1t ∪ E 2t = E t and E t being the set of banks in the market at time t.
To sum up, for each single observation (ijt) in the sample, we can write one of the following probabilities, either:
The assumption of conditional independence of branching costs through time, across markets and banks, allows us to write the log-likelihood function for the whole sample as:
Turning to the econometric specification, we need to choose a specific density function for the branching costs. Given that the support should be non-negative, one solution is to assume an exponential distribution with non-negative parameter λ.
The objective of the econometric analysis is to estimate the parameters c and λ, conditionally on the set of observable variables W ijt . Furthermore, let us split the set of exogenous variables W ijt into two subsets, namely W ijt ={x ijt , z jt }. We posit that the distribution of branching costs depends upon the vector of exogenous variables x ijt according to the following probability density function:
while the inverse degree of competition in each market depends upon the vector z jt according to the probability density function:
To conclude, the objective of the econometric test is to recover the mean of the distribution of branching costs together with the measure of the degree of competition given the set of observable variables W ijt ={x ijt , z jt }.
European banks in the sample
The econometric test allows us to separately estimate factors affecting the toughness of competition in each country from factors affecting branching costs. We have however to make a priori assumptions on how a limited set of explanatory variables, with little help from the theory or the empirical literature, affect competitiveness rather than branching costs. We spend the rest of the section to describe the sample and the set of observable variables used in the implementation of the econometric test.
The sample
Our sample consists of annual data on banks in nine EEC countries, namely Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal and Spain. The economic unit on which we focus is the single bank and not its single branch, because we believe that strategic decisions about the size of the branching network are taken at the bank level.
Therefore, banks that have been operating for at least two consecutive years between 1990
and 1996 in the nine countries are retained from the Bank Base, a database supplied by the Bankers' Almanac, containing detailed information on each bank for all countries.
Our sample is quite representative of the overall banking system in each country as it mimics fairly well its structure, at least according to the average branching size. (See Table 1) From Table 1 one can see that the average number of branches in the sample is comparable to the OECD figures for Belgium, Germany, and France, while, for the other countries, larger banks are slightly over sampled.
[ Table 1 here] Table 2 provides some statistics on the partition of observations in our sample according to branching behavior. It appears that, within the set of multi-branch banks, the majority (2565) opened new branches or kept their network size unchanged, while only a small number (307) closed branches. The two sets are balanced by the unit banks, which by definition did not change their branching behavior.
[ Table 2 here]
Although the majority of multi-branch banks falls into the "expanding" class, this
proportion varies across countries (as can be seen in Table 3 ). Notice further that the structure of banking industries can be quite different as one can infer from the comparison of the percentage of unit banks across countries.
[ Table 3 here]
A large proportion of banks, namely 26.90%, has only one branch, presumably the headquarters of the bank. Although unit banks are more likely to operate in the wholesale segment, where branches do not give any competitive edge on rivals, we consider them to be present also in the retail segment, whenever collecting retail customer deposits. Indeed, the choice of being a unit bank is a signal of higher branching costs compared to other banks that concentrate the bulk of their operations in the retail segment.
Very few banks in the sample entered new markets between 1990 and 1996. Entry in the market occurs either when a new bank begins to operate in a country, or when a preexistent bank in the sample starts to operate in a different country, by opening branches or by acquiring a local bank. However, entry and its symmetric event, exit, did not occur except for a very few banks that have been discarded because our analysis only focuses on the branching behavior of incumbent banks.
Mergers and acquisitions
There have been several Merger and Acquisition (M&A) deals in Europe over the sample period, some of them performed across national borders. 7 While collecting data on banks and their branching networks by country, however we were not able to recover all M&A deals that involved banks in our data set: the reason being that except for large public banks, it is 7 See Gual and Neven (1992) , ERE Summary Report (1996) for detailed figures on cross-borders and inside borders M&As in the last years. We refer to Danthine et al. (1999) Table 4 for the distribution of deals across countries). In 37 cases the bank was involved in a merger, while in 58 in an acquisition deal. Among the acquisitions, in 45 cases (2 cross-borders) the bank was active in the deal, while in 13 cases (2 cross-borders) it was passive.
[ Table 4 here]
All acquisitions recorded in our sample refer to cases where the acquiring bank gained majority control over the acquired bank. Furthermore, only major mergers were taken into account, that is mergers involving two or more medium to big banks. Finally we do not have any information on deals involving banks in Greece and Portugal.
Even though our list of M&A is not exhaustive, there still is a large enough number of deals to test the impact of M&A on branching costs. Notice that in the model there is no difference between opening (or closing) a new branch or acquiring (or selling) a branch through a M&A deal. We hence included in our data set a dummy variable that indicates if an observation is involved in a M&A deal.
Deregulation variables
In the eighties, the institutional framework in which banks were operating has changed drastically, as a consequence of the deregulation process that has affected both banking competition and the structure of markets, through the relaxation of entry barriers within and across markets. A description of the legal framework in which banks operate is out of the scope of this paper. Table 5 ) There is often a lag between the time in which a particular regulation is passed at the EEC level and its implementation at the national level. Each deregulation dummy is set equal to one since the year of implementation in a specific country, rather than when the policy was passed at the European level. 10 We focus on three important measures. The second rule, interest rate deregulation (IRD), is the set of laws and policies, at the national level, aimed at increasing interest rate competition among banks. We expect to see an increase in the degree of competition. However IRD policies were enforced in six out of nine countries by 1990, the starting year in our data set (with the exception of Belgium in 1991, Portugal in 1992 and Greece in 1993). Therefore their effect on competition must be assessed by measuring for each country the divergence from the overall degree of competition after their implementation. More specifically we have included both CFL and IRD in the set of variables {z jt } in the equation (10).
Finally, the third dummy refers to the second European directive 1989/n.646 (SED). This directive has introduced the principle of single license for banks, which must facilitate entry by foreign banks across EEC markets. Furthermore by shifting the capital requirement for a bank that enters a new market, from each single branch to the bank level, we expect to see a reduction in the cost of opening new branches across countries. We test for this effect by including SED into the set of explanatory variables {x ijt } in equation (9).
[ Table 5 here]
Inputs costs and market variables
Costs, in particular the cost of labor and the interest rate on real capital, may affect the choice of opening a new branch, as they represent the fixed factors for branch operations.
Labor cost is an important component of fixed costs in branching, as personnel is needed to run a branch and must be paid independently of the level of activity of that particular branch.
More specifically, the unit labor cost in a particular region (country) must affect the decision
as to whether open a new branch in that region. Therefore, we look at the way in which the real wage in the banking sector (Wage) affects the average cost of branching, by including it in the equation (9), expecting a positive relationship.
Opening a branch also involves renting or buying facilities in a particular location, i.e.
investing in fixed capital. The average cost of branching should increase if the real interest rates (Rirate), as a proxy for the opportunity cost of investing in fixed capital, increases.
Unfortunately this proxy may pin down also other effects, as for example the costs of interbank funds or more generally an indicator of the level of economic activity linked to monetary policy, and therefore the results should be carefully interpreted. If, on the one hand, the real interest rate were to capture the cost of funds in the interbank market, we should expect a negative correlation with the cost of branching, since a rise in the interbank rate increases the convenience of collecting funds through branches. On the other hand, since real interest rates are directly related to monetary policy, when economic activity grows we expect interest rates to be low and competition for clients among banks to be softer, hence a positive relation between real rates and degree of competition. Only the empirical test allows us to tell which of these two effects is the most relevant.
Furthermore in order to compute the threshold value A ijt , defined in the equation (4), we use total deposits for each country as a proxy for market size, S, while N is the total number of branches in the country. Finally, for each bank in the sample, we have the number of branches, k. Table 6 provides the average values for the exogenous variables included in the econometric model.
[ Table 6 here]
Results
The maximization of the log-likelihood function given by equation (8), where we assume F ε (.) to be exponential, is performed by a non-linear optimization routine provided by the statistical software package GAUSS. In terms of the theory of Pseudo Maximum Likelihood (see Gouriéroux and Jouneau, 1993) , given that the density function belongs to the exponential family, parameters are consistently estimated. However, the assumption of independence across individuals, time and markets of the stochastic cost variable as well as the choice of the density are arbitrary and involve a potential problem of mis-specification.
Hence we computed the White heteroskedastic-consistent covariance matrix to obtain correct standard errors of the estimates.
In the rest of the section we present the results of two models, a deterministic one, in which only the time trend and country dummies were introduced in both parameters, and a non deterministic model, in which the other market and time specific variables are also used to explain the two parameters. In this section we first present some measures of the goodness
of fit and then we analyze the results of the econometric test.
Goodness of fit
We present three measures of goodness of fit that are appropriate for binary discrete choice models such as the one estimated in this paper. The McFadden Pseudo-R 2 , computed for both models (see Table 8 ), indicates that the deterministic model performs slightly better than the non deterministic one. But it also shows that the included regressors significantly improve
(by approximately 36%) the explanatory power of both models relatively to the restricted model where the probability of falling into one of the two classes of banks only depends upon a constant.
To gain more insight into the predictive power of the non deterministic model, we show two additional measures of the goodness of fit (see C and σ n in Table 7 ) based on the comparison of the observed partition with the estimated partition of the sample.
The percentage of correct predictions C, indicates that the model correctly predicts the branching behavior for 80.3% of observations in the sample. Note that the incorrectly predicted observations are located outside the main diagonal of Tables 7.
[ Table 7 here]
The average branching size of banks that have opened branches, but that the model places into the group of banks that have closed branches (see the southwest cell of For completeness, and given that C may be misleading 11 , we also computed σ n , which can be interpreted, similarly to a R 2 , as the percentage of the variability of the phenomenon explained by the model. This measure takes on a value of almost 60% for our non deterministic model. 
Results of the estimation
Parameter estimates as well as t-ratios are gathered in Table 8 , in which we present the results of two estimations. The first column refers to a completely deterministic model, while in the second column we report the results of the best, according to a cautious selection 11 We refer to Veall et al. (1996) for a discussion of this specific issue. 12 Notice that σ n is a R 2 -type measure for binary prediction/realization tables, that varies between 0 and 1. (See Veall et al. (1996), p.254) process, combination among the variables that explain the levels of the two parameters of the model, the degree of competition and the mean value of branching costs.
The coefficients in the upper part of Table 8 measure the impact of exogenous variables on c , the elasticity of profits to branching, or, alternatively, the inverse of the degree of toughness of competition. A negative sign implies an increase in the degree of competition.
We can also interpret a negative sign as inducing a lower probability that banks open new branches, namely a shrinking in the average size of branching networks. The reason is that a smaller c , implies a reduction in the quantity A it , which is the upper bound of the area defining the probability of opening new branches, according to equations (6a) and (6b).
As for the parameter ε , a coefficient associated with the branching cost, measures the magnitude of the effect of the explanatory variables on the average cost of branching and, as a consequence, its indirect impact on the probability of opening new branches. In the rest of the section we concentrate on the estimated coefficients of the non deterministic model.
[ Table 8 here]
At the beginning of the 1990 integration among European financial markets was far from being achieved and banking industries were still very different across countries, mainly for historical reasons. To test for the degree of segmentation, or lack of integration, in addition to the differences captured by the institutional changes in the years analyzed in our sample, we allow in the empirical analysis the degree of competition to be different across countries. As a matter of fact, the country dummies are highly significant for the parameter measuring interest rate competition. Thus, we take this as evidence that starting conditions of price competition across countries were significantly different in 1990 and must be taken into consideration. Notice further that we have set France as the benchmark country to which other countries have to be compared. It follows that competitive conditions in Italy and Germany are not significantly different from France.
The time trend for the parameter c is negative, so that competition becomes fiercer as time goes. Note that this implies that the efficient size of branching networks decreases. This cannot be seen directly from descriptive statistics as the average number of branches per bank would indicate a positive trend, at least in some countries. (Compare to Table 1) The effect of increasing toughness of interest rate competition does seem to be induced partly by other national deregulation policies, captured by the time trend, and partly by the capital flow liberalization (dummy CFL). On one hand, the time trend probably captures the effect of changes in regulation at the country level more than those at the European Community level. On the other hand, capital flow liberalization has certainly increased competition, by increasing integration between markets, and therefore fostering rivalry among banks.
For interest rate deregulation (IRD) we have included a dummy only for three out of nine countries since this set of policies has been implemented after 1990 only in these three countries (namely in 1991 in Belgium, in 1992 in Portugal and in 1993 in Greece). For the other countries instead the impact of IRD is absorbed by the constant. Therefore we can measure only the differential impact of IRD for the three latest countries compared to the others. The negative coefficients for Belgium and Portugal indicates that IRD has increased competition, while this has not happened yet in Greece. Here, the effects of changes in the regulatory environment are weaker. The dummy linked to the effectiveness of the second European directive (SED) has a negative sign, although not significant, showing that this directive has decreased the cost of opening new branches.
Finally the positive coefficient of M&A, although not significant, indicates that for those banks branching costs are higher. This could be evidence that for banks involved in M&As branching networks need to be restructured, due to duplication of networks, or that there are other economic reasons other than economies of scale in branching for M&As.
Costs and competitiveness across countries
The econometric results have implications for the degree of competition and for the choice of branching in the different countries. Together with the values of c , figures on profits, marginal benefits of branching, estimated branching costs by country are gathered in Table 9 . While the absolute values of these estimated variables may not be entirely realistic, the ordering of the countries in terms of degree of competition and branching behavior they imply is informative and close to observed facts.
[ Table 9 here] Concerning the strategic interactions among banks in the retail banking industry, note that the average estimated value for the parameter c is 1.37. So the expansive effect of branching is quite important and therefore, we would overestimate the competitive effect in choosing a model of pure spatial competition to analyze the branching decision. A model of monopolistic competition turns out to be a better modeling choice at least for our sample. In addition, a value of c larger than one indicates that the response of profits to branching is considerable and thus, that branching still gives banks in the retail segment an edge over competitors. This is also confirmed by the fact that, on average, the estimated average marginal benefit of opening an additional branch is 0.48 percent of the overall profits of a bank. 
Conclusions
The main feature of our simple econometric analysis is to treat branching costs as a latent variable. Based on this idea, a model of monopolistic competition, fitted on microeconomic data, provides a fair approximation of the conduct of European banks. The analysis also produces a series of useful measures as for instance the degree of competition, the level of economic profits and marginal benefits of opening branches.
The results of the paper can be summarized as follows. First, deregulation has certainly increased the degree of competition within the European retail banking industry. In particular capital flow liberalization has contributed to foster interest rates competition. However the overall impact of deregulation is better captured by the time trend, that indicates increasing competition in interest rates. We interpret this as evidence that the deregulatory environment is more complex than the sum of rules passed at the European Community level. While, on one hand, these rules have pushed for an effective change of the working of the market, on the other hand, idiosyncrasies in the deregulation process at the country level play a prominent role. Second, regardless of convergence towards higher level of competitiveness there are still differences across banking industries.
Provided that data are available on entry and exit from the industry, the level of entry costs could be estimated together with branching costs. Furthermore, with a more dynamic setting, we might be able to improve our results in this line of investigation. These extensions are part of our research agenda. SED (1989 SED ( , n.646) 1990 SED ( 1991 SED ( 1992 SED ( 1993 SED ( 1994 SED ( 1995 SED ( 1996 Goodness-of-fit: C = 80.3 %; σ n =59.2 % Note: In each cell, the figures provide the percentage of banks over the total number of observations (3929) that fall in the corresponding case. The average branching size for these banks is in brackets. The Table is based on the predictions of the non deterministic model. Note: all coefficients measure the distance from the benchmark, i.e. France. 
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